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Detection of Biasing Attacks on Distributed Estimation Networks
Mohammad Deghat Valery Ugrinovskii Iman Shames Ce´dric Langbort
Abstract— The paper addresses the problem of detecting
attacks on distributed estimator networks that aim to inten-
tionally bias process estimates produced by the network. It
provides a sufficient condition, in terms of the feasibility of
certain linear matrix inequalities, which guarantees distributed
input attack detection using an H∞ approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
With recent rapid developments in the area of networked
control and estimation, the security of networked systems
against input attacks and faults becomes increasingly impor-
tant. The mainstream of the results in the literature focus on
centralized attack and fault detection, however some recent
work has been done on distributed attack and fault detection
due to the fact that not all measurements might be available
at each node of the network; see [2], [9], [10], [13], [5], [3]
and the references therein.
This paper considers the problem of detection of attacks on
consensus-based distributed estimation networks. The topic
of distributed estimation has gained considerable attention
in the literature, in a bid to reduce communication bot-
tlenecks and improve reliability and fidelity of centralized
state observers. Filter cooperation and consensus ideas have
proved to be instrumental in the design of distributed state
observers [7], [15], [16]. At the same time, consensus-based
systems are particularly vulnerable to intentional attacks
since the compromised agents can interfere with the func-
tions of the entire network in a significant way [8]. Uncer-
tainty and noise represent another challenge from the attack
detection viewpoint — state observers are typically required
in applications where uncertainty and noise make accessing
the system state difficult; this may allow the attackers to
remain undetected by injecting signals compatible with the
noise statistics [9]. This motivates an increased interest in the
literature in detection of rogue behaviours of state observers.
In this paper, we consider a general framework of dis-
tributed state estimation considered, for example, in [15],
[16], [18] and assume that some of the nodes of the network
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are compromised. Mathematically, this situation is modelled
by allowing the compromised observers to be driven by
certain attack/fault inputs. The purpose of the attack under
consideration is to force the compromised node to pro-
duce biased state estimates and then exploit the consensus
mechanism within the network to propagate those estimates
across the network. Conventional false data injections into
measurements can also be included in the model as a routine
extension of our results.
From the viewpoint of fault detection/input estimation,
the system subject to attack is distributed itself. This is
similar to [13], but is different from [5], [3] which were
focused on detecting faults applied to the observed plant.
We use an H∞ fault detection approach which allows for
a broad range of uncertainty in the sensors and the plant
model, as well as a quite broad range of attack inputs.
Furthermore, to detect the attack/fault, the proposed attack
observers use the same plant measurements and the state
estimate information communicated from the neighbours as
the state observers themselves. The key idea is to use this
information, without additional communication overheads, to
determine which of the node observers’ behaviour differs
from what this information predicts.
Our idea of governing the detectors by neighbours’ state
estimates to track the attack input is similar to [12], where
integral action controllers governed by diffusive couplings
were used for averaging constant disturbances. More pre-
cisely, in [12] distributed integral action controllers were
used for averaging constant disturbances to enable all agents
in the system to synchronize to a common reference system
governed by the averaged constant disturbance. In contrast,
here we are interested in tracking individual attack inputs,
rather than tracking an averaged attack vector. Techni-
cally this required us to introduce additional dynamics into
the fault detectors. Also unlike [12], the H∞ formulation
adopted here does not restrict the attack inputs to be con-
stants.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II, a
background on distributed consensus based estimation is
presented. Also, the idea of distributed attack estimation with
H∞ consensus is explained and the attack detection problem
is formulated in that section. The main result is given in
Section III, where a sufficient condition in terms of coupled
linear matrix inequalities is expressed. Concluding remarks
are given in Section IV.
Notation: Rn denotes the real Euclidean n-dimensional
vector space, with the norm ‖x‖ = (x′x)1/2; here the
symbol ′ denotes the transpose of a matrix or a vector. The
symbol In denotes the n × n identity matrix, and 0m×n
denotes the zero matrix of size m×n. We will occasionally
use I and 0 for notational convenience if no confusion is
expected. For real symmetric n × n matrices X and Y ,
Y > X (respectively, Y ≥ X) means the matrix Y − X
is positive definite (respectively, positive semidefinite). The
notation L2[0,∞) refers to the Lebesgue space of Rn-valued
vector-functions z(.), defined on the time interval [0,∞),
with the norm ‖z‖2 ,
(∫∞
0
‖z(t)‖2dt
)1/2
and the inner
product
∫∞
0
z′1(t)z2(t)dt.
II. FORMULATION OF THE DISTRIBUTED ATTACK
DETECTION PROBLEM
A. Network topology
Consider a filter network with N nodes and a directed
graph topology G = (V,E) where V and E are the set
of vertices and the set of edges (i.e, the subset of the set
V × V), respectively. Without loss of generality, we let
V = {1, 2, . . . , N}. The graph G is assumed to be directed,
reflecting the fact that while node i receives the information
from node j, this relation may not be reciprocal. The notation
(j, i) will denote the edge of the graph originating at node
j and ending at node i. It is assumed that the nodes of the
graph G have no self-loops, i.e., (i, i) 6∈ E.
For each i ∈ V, let Vi = {j : (j, i) ∈ E} be the set of
nodes supplying information to node i. The cardinality of
Vi, known as the in-degree of node i, is denoted pi; i.e.,
pi is equal to the number of incoming edges for node i.
Also, qi will denote the number of outgoing edges for node
i, known as the out-degree of node i. Let A = [aij ] be the
adjacency matrix of the digraph G, i.e., aij = 1 if (j, i) ∈ E,
otherwise aij = 0. Then, pi =
∑N
j=1 aij =
∑
j∈Vi
aij ,
qi =
∑N
j=1 aji.
B. Background: distributed consensus-based H∞ estimation
A typical distributed consensus-based H∞ estimation
problem considers a plant described by the equation
x˙ = Ax+B2ξ(t), x(0) = x0, x ∈ R
n, (1)
governed by an disturbance input ξ ∈ Rm. A network of
filters connected according to the graph G takes measure-
ments of the plant with the purpose to produce an estimate
of x. It is assumed that each filter takes measurements
yi = C2ix+D2iξ + D¯2iξi, (2)
where ξi(t) ∈ Rmi represents the measurement disturbance
at the local sensing node i, and processes them locally using
an information communicated by its neighbours j, j ∈ Vi.
Depending on the nature of the disturbances ξ, ξi, the
processing can be done using Kalman [7] or H∞ [15], [16],
[18] filters, both using innovations in the measurements and
the neighbours’ information for feedback. To be concrete,
from now on we build the presentation around the distributed
H∞ consensus filter introduced in [16], [18], although the
approach to bias attack detection proposed in this paper is
general enough to allow extensions to other types of filters
in an obvious manner.
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Fig. 1. An auxiliary ‘input tracking’ model.
According to [16], suppose the disturbances ξ, ξi belong to
L2[0,∞); this assumption suffices to guarantee that equation
(1) has an L2-integrable solution on any finite time interval
[0, T ], even when the matrix A is unstable. Then using the
Luenberger type observer, each filter produces an estimate
xˆi of the state x
˙ˆxi = Axˆi + Li(yi(t)− C2ixˆi) +Ki
∑
j∈Vi
(xˆj − xˆi), (3)
xˆi(0) = 0,
where the matrices Li, Ki are the parameters of the filter. The
observer structure indicates that each node takes advantage of
being interconnected with other nodes in that each filter uses
its neighbours estimates xˆj , j ∈ Vi. The problem in [16] was
to determine estimator gains Li and Ki in (3) to ensure the
filter internal stability and acceptable H∞ attenuation of the
effect which disturbances have on the consensus performance
of the filter.
C. The bias attack model
The particular problem of interest in this paper is to con-
sider the situation where one or several nodes of the network
of observers described in the previous sections are subject
to bias attack. While a commonly considered situation is
when the attacker interferes with the measurements and/or
communications between the nodes, here in contrast, we
consider the situation where the attacker mounts an attack
on the observer dynamics. That is, we consider the situation
where in lieu of (3), some of the nodes generate their
estimates according to
˙ˆxi = Axˆi + Li(yi(t)− C2ixˆi) +Ki
∑
j∈Vi
(xˆj − xˆi) + fi, (4)
xˆi(0) = 0,
where fi is the attack input. From now on, our focus is
exclusively on the network of observers (4).
To present the class of admissible attack signals under
consideration in this paper, consider an auxiliary ‘input
tracking’ model shown in Fig. 1, with a stable square n×n
transfer function Gi(s), with invertible Gi(0). Since Gi(s)
is square, then input fi and output ηi of the system in Fig. 1
are of dimension n.
Assumption 1: Given a stable square n×n transfer func-
tion Gi(s), the class of admissible bias inputs under consid-
eration consists of all signals fi(t), t ≥ 0, such that∫ ∞
0
‖fi − ηi‖
2dt <∞. (5)
Consider the tracking error of the system shown in Fig. 1
νi = ηi−fi. Under Assumption 1, νi is a finite energy signal.
Denoting the Laplace transforms of fi and νi as fi(s) and
νi(s) respectively, and noting that
νi(s) = −(In +
1
s
Gi(s))
−1fi(s),
condition (5) is equivalent to∫ +j∞
−j∞
‖(I +
1
s
Gi(s))
−1fi(s)‖
2ds <∞. (6)
Note also that the invertibility of Gi(0) guarantees that
limt→∞ ‖fi(t) − ηi(t)‖ = 0 for inputs fi that have a finite
limit at ∞.
In practice, of course the transfer function Gi(s) must be
selected by the designer based on the anticipated behaviour
of the attack inputs fi(t). It remains unknown to the attacker.
For example, to capture a class of bias injection attack inputs
consisting of a steady-state component and an exponentially
decaying transient component generated by a low pass fil-
ter [14] it suffices to choose Gi(s) = 1s+2ǫi In, where In is
the n× n identity matrix, and ǫi > 0 is a constant. It must
be noted that even with this choice of Gi(s), the designer
does not need to know the asymptotic steady-state value
or the shape of the transient, as all such signals fi satisfy
condition (6). Furthermore, such signals have the property
that limt→∞ fi(t) exists and therefore we can ensure that
‖fi(t) − ηi(t)‖ → 0 as t → ∞. More generally, signals
representing a combination of constants and L2-integrable
inputs satisfy (6). In addition to bias attack policies fi
described above, L2-integrable inputs fi are included which
represent attack inputs with limited energy resource [14].
It can be readily shown that the state-space model for the
system in Fig 1 can be written as
ω˙i = Ωiωi + Γiνi, (7)
ηi = [I 0]ωi, ωi(0) = 0,
where νi = ηi − fi is an L2-integrable input, according to
Assumption 1. In particular, in the special case Gi(s) =
1
s+2ǫi
In, we have ωi ∈ R2n, and
Ωi =
[
0 I
0 −2ǫiI
]
, Γi =
[
0
−I
]
. (8)
D. The proposed attack detector
The objective of the paper is to design a (distributed)
attack detection system which is capable of tracking attack
inputs satisfying Assumption 1. To this end, we consider the
following outputs which summarize the information about
the network available at node i, and can be used by the
attack detector
ζi = yi − C2ixˆi
= C2i(x− xˆi) +D2iξ + D¯2iξi, (9)
ζ¯i =
∑
j∈Vi
(xˆj − xˆi). (10)
The idea behind introducing these outputs is as follows. If
node i is under attack, then its predicted sensor measurement
C2ixˆi is expected to be biased, compared to the actual
measurement yi. This must lead to a significant difference
between these two signals, i.e., we must expect a large energy
in ζi. Likewise, the observer under attack is expected to
cause the system to deviate from the state of consensus,
causing the state of the observer i, xˆi to deviate from the
average estimate produced at the neighbouring nodes. Thus,
the disagreement variable ζ¯i at node i is expected to differ
from similar variables produced by the rest of the network.
This motivates using these outputs for detecting the attack.
Let ei = x − xˆi be the local estimation error at node i.
Using (1) and (4), it is straightforward to verify that the local
filter errors satisfy the following equation:
e˙i = (A− LiC2i)ei +Ki
∑
j∈Vi
(ej − ei)
+ (B2 − LiD2i)ξ − LiD¯2iξi − fi, ei(0) = x0.(11)
The outputs (9), (10) can be rewritten in terms of the
estimation errors as
ζi = C2iei +D2iξ + D¯2iξi, (12)
ζ¯i = −
∑
j∈Vi
(ej − ei). (13)
Hence, we can consider the collection of systems (11) as
a large-scale plant governed by the vector of attack inputs
f = [f ′1, . . . , f
′
N ]
′
, and equipped with the outputs (12),
(13). It is worth stressing that these outputs can be readily
generated at the observer i, computing them only requires the
local measurements yi, the local estimate xˆi computed by the
observer at node i and the neighbours estimates xˆj , j ∈ Vi,
available to that observer. Therefore the outputs (12), (13)
are available for tracking the attack inputs. To achieve this,
consider the system combining the estimation error dynamics
(11) and the auxiliary input tracking model (7):
e˙i = (A− LiC2i)ei +Ki
∑
j∈Vi
(ej − ei)− [I 0]ωi
+ (B2 − LiD2i)ξ − LiD¯2iξi + νi, ei(0) = x0,
ω˙i = Ωiωi + Γiνi ωi(0) = 0. (14)
The system (14) equipped with the outputs (12), (13)
is an uncertain system governed by L2-integrable inputs
ξ, ξi and νi. Each such system is interconnected with its
neighbours via inputs ej , and the collection of all such
systems represents a large-scale system. We propose the
following distributed H∞ observer for this large-scale system
which utilizes the outputs (12), (13) to obtain estimates of
ei and ωi while attenuating the disturbances ξ, ξi and νi,
i = 1, . . . , N :
˙ˆei = (A− LiC2i)eˆi +Ki
∑
j∈Vi
(eˆj − eˆi)− [I 0]ωˆi
+ Fi(ζi − C2ieˆi) +Hi

ζ¯i + ∑
j∈Vi
(eˆj − eˆi)

 ,
˙ˆωi = Ωiωˆi + F
η
i (ζi − C2ieˆi) +H
η
i

ζ¯i + ∑
j∈Vi
(eˆj − eˆi)

 ,
eˆi(0) = 0, ωˆi(0) = 0. (15)
The coefficients Fi, Hi, F ηi , H
η
i are to be found in such a
way that ηˆi : ηˆi = [I 0]ωˆi tracks the output ηi of the auxiliary
system (7). Then, since according to the definition of the
auxiliary signal ηi, this signal represents fi asymptotically,
we propose using ηˆi as a residual variable indicating whether
the attack is taking place.
To formalize the above idea, introduce the error vectors
zi = ei− eˆi, δi = ωi− ωˆi. Using the extended system model
(14) and the corresponding observer (15), the evolution of
these error vectors is governed by the following equations
z˙i = (A− LiC2i)zi +Ki
∑
j∈Vi
(zj − zi)− [I 0]δi
− FiC2izi +Hi
∑
j∈Vi
(zj − zi)
+ (B2 − LiD2i)ξ − LiD¯2iξi + νi
− FiD2iξ − FiD¯2iξi, zi(0) = x0,
δ˙i = Ωiδi − F
η
i C2izi +H
η
i
∑
j∈Vi
(zj − zi)
− F ηi D2iξ − F
η
i D¯2iξi + Γiνi, δi(0) = 0. (16)
Note that we can introduce new variables L˜i = Li + Fi,
K˜i = Ki +Hi, and re-write (16) as
z˙i = (A− L˜iC2i)zi + K˜i
∑
j∈Vi
(zj − zi)− [I 0]δi
+ (B2 − L˜iD2i)ξ − L˜iD¯2iξi + νi, zi(0) = x0,
δ˙i = Ωiδi − F
η
i C2izi +H
η
i
∑
j∈Vi
(zj − zi)
− F ηi D2iξ − F
η
i D¯2iξi + Γiνi, δi(0) = 0. (17)
Problem 1 (The H∞ detector design problem): The dis-
tributed attack detection problem under consideration in this
paper is to determine L˜i, K˜i, F ηi , H
η
i such that the following
conditions hold:
(i) The large-scale system (17) is internally stable. Equiv-
alently, the disturbance and attack-free large-scale sys-
tem
z˙i = (A− L˜iC2i)zi + K˜i
∑
j∈Vi
(zj − zi)− [I 0]δi,
δ˙i = Ωiδi − F
η
i C2izi +H
η
i
∑
j∈Vi
(zj − zi), (18)
zi(0) = x0, δi(0) = 0,
must be asymptotically stable.
(ii) In the presence of disturbances and attack signals, all
from the class of L2-integrable signals, the system (17)
achieves a guaranteed level of H∞ filtering perfor-
mance:
sup
x0,w 6=0
∫∞
0
∑N
i=1(δ
′
iQiδi + z
′
iQ¯izi)dt
‖x0‖2P +
∑N
i=1 ‖wi‖
2
2
≤ γ2, (19)
where Qi = Q′i > 0, Q¯i = Q¯′i ≥ 0 are given
matrices, ‖x0‖2P = x′0Px0, P = P ′ > 0 is a fixed
matrix to be determined later, wi , [ξ′, ξ′i, ν′i]′, w ,
[w′1, . . . ,w
′
N ]
′
, and γ > 0 is a constant.
It follows from (19) that each attack detector variable ωˆi
provides an H∞ estimate of ωi. We now show that provided
Assumption 1 holds, the output ηˆi = [I 0]ωˆi of the observer
(15) converges to fi, and hence it can be used as a residual
indicator of attack.
Lemma 1: Suppose Assumption 1 holds and the observer
network (4) is such that the disturbance and attack-free large-
scale system (18) is asymptotically stable, and also (19) holds
with Q¯i > 0. Then ‖ηˆi − fi‖ → 0 as t→ ∞ for all fi that
have a finite limit at ∞.
Note that (19) with Q¯i > 0 requires the observer to ensure
disturbance attenuation with respect to both δi and zi, even
though only the variable δi captures the tracking error of
interest. When Q¯i = 0 and condition (19) reduces to a
weaker condition we can guarantee that ηˆi converges to fi
in L2 sense, even when fi does not have a finite limit at ∞.
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 1 holds and the observer
network (4) is such that the disturbance and attack-free large-
scale system (18) is asymptotically stable, and also condition
(19) holds with Q¯i = 0,
sup
x0,w 6=0
∫∞
0
∑N
i=1 δ
′
iQiδidt
‖x0‖2P +
∑N
i=1 ‖wi‖
2
2
≤ γ2. (20)
Then
∑N
i=1
∫∞
0
‖ηˆi − fi‖
2dt <∞.
It is worth noting that the system (15) is governed by
the outputs of the observer network (4); therefore it can
be implemented to monitor the health of the network. We
explain in the next section how to design L˜i, K˜i, F ηi , and
H
η
i such that the above conditions hold.
III. ATTACK DETECTOR DESIGN
Problem 1 belongs to the class of distributed stabilization
by output injection problems. References [4], [16], [18]
developed a vector dissipativity approach to solve this class
of problems which will be applied here as well. For each
node i, consider a candidate storage function Vi(zi, δi) =
[z′i δ
′
i]Xi[z
′
i δ
′
i]
′
, where Xi = X ′i > 0. The following
vector dissipation inequality is instrumental in proving input
tracking properties of the distributed attack detector (15):
V˙i+2αiVi+δ
′
iQiδi+z
′
iQ¯izi ≤
∑
j∈Vj
πjVj+γ
2‖wi‖
2, (21)
where πi, πj are constants selected so that the matrix

−2α1 π2a12 . . . πNa1N
π1a21 −2α2 . . . πNa2N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
π1aN1 π2aN2 . . . −2αN


is diagonally dominant (and therefore it is Hurwitz [11]);
here, aij is the element of the adjacency matrix of the graph
G. Indeed adding the inequalities (21) will result in
N∑
i=1
V˙i +
N∑
i=1
(δ′iQiδi + z
′
iQ¯izi)
≤max{−2α1 + q1π1, . . . ,−2αN + qNπN}
N∑
i=1
Vi
+ γ2
N∑
i=1
(‖ξ‖2 + ‖ξi‖
2 + ‖νi‖
2).
Selecting πi < 2αiqi and letting ε = min{2α1 −
q1π1, . . . , 2αN − qNπN} > 0, V =
∑N
i=1 Vi, we then have
V˙ +
N∑
i=1
(δ′iQiδi + z
′
iQ¯izi) ≤
−εV + γ2
N∑
i=1
(‖ξ‖2 + ‖ξi‖
2 + ‖νi‖
2). (22)
This implies that when ξ = 0 and fi = 0, ξi = 0 ∀i, then
V˙ < −εV,
and provided Xi > 0, we have zi → 0, δi → 0 exponentially.
That is, condition (i) of Problem 1 is established.
Also, when at least one of the signals ξ, ξi or fi is not
equal to zero (the latter is equivalent to νi 6≡ 0), then it
follows from (22) that
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(δ′iQiδi + z
′
iQ¯izi)dt ≤
N∑
i=1
[Vi(zi(0), δi(0))
+ γ2
∫ T
0
(‖ξ‖2 + ‖ξi‖
2 + ‖νi‖
2)dt
]
.
Note that Vi(zi(0), δi(0)) = x′0X11i x0, where X11i is the
upper left block in the partition of Xi compatible with the
dimensions of zi and δi. Hence (19) also holds with P =
γ−2
∑N
i=1X
11
i . It follows from this discussion that condition
(21) ensures satisfaction of the conditions of Lemma 1.
Therefore, to ensure that the distributed observer (15) can
track the attack input fi we need to determine coefficients
L˜i, K˜i, F
η
i , and H
η
i for it so that (21) is satisfied.
To present conditions under which (21) holds, introduce
the notation
A
µ
i =
[
A −[I 0]
0 Ωi
]
, B
µ
1 =
[
I
Γi
]
, B
µ
2 =
[
−B2 0
0 0
]
,
D
µ
2i =
[
D2i D¯2i
]
, C
µ
2i =
[
C2i 0
]
, Hµ =
[
I 0
]
,
L
µ
i =
[
L˜i
F
η
i
]
, K
µ
i =
[
K˜i
H
η
i
]
. (23)
Suppose D2i and D¯2i satisfy the condition
E2i , D
µ
2i(D
µ
2i)
′ = D2iD
′
2i + D¯2iD¯
′
2i > 0. (24)
The above assumption on E2i is a standard assumption made
in nonsingular H∞ control problems [1].
Now let us introduce the matrix
Q
µ
i =
[
Q¯i 0
0 Qi
]
, (25)
where Qi = Q′i > 0. Also, Q¯i = Q¯′i is selected to be
positive definite when the aim is to design an attack observer
to achieve asymptotic tracking of attack inputs. If L2 tracking
is acceptable, one can let Q¯i = 0. Given αi > 0, define
πi =
2αi
qi+1
, where qi is the out-degree of the graph node i.
Clearly πi = 2αiqi+1 <
2αi
qi
.
Theorem 1: Suppose Assumption 1 holds and the digraph
G, the matrices Qi = Q′i > 0, Q¯i = Q¯′i > 0, i = 1, · · · , 6
and the constants αi > 0, i = 1, · · · , N are such that the
coupled linear matrix inequalities in (27) (on the next page)
with respect to the variables Xi = X ′i > 0 and Mi, i =
1, · · · , N are feasible. Then choosing
K
µ
i = −X
−1
i Mi,
L
µ
i = (γ
2X−1i (C
µ
2i)
′ −Bµ
2
(Dµ
2i)
′)E−1
2i
(26)
ensures that the condition (21) holds.
Combined with Lemma 1 or Lemma 2, this theorem
provides a complete result on the design of biasing attack
detectors for the distributed observer (4).
IV. CONCLUSION
The paper is concerned with the problem of distributed
attack detection is sensor networks. We consider a group
of consensus-based distributed estimators and assume that
the estimator dynamics are under attack. Then we propose
a distributed H∞ attack detector which allows for a broad
range of uncertainty in the sensors and the plant model, as
well as a quite broad range of bias attack inputs, and show
that the proposed attack detector can track individual attack
inputs at different sensors. A possible future direction is to
construct a compensator to cancel the detected attack in the
system.
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